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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY  
Directorate of Intelligence  
May 30, 1975

MEMORANDUM

SUBJECT: Prospects for Pakistan

Key Points

- Internally, Pakistan probably will remain stable during the next two years.
- Externally, we foresee no major threat to Pakistan's security and territorial integrity in this time frame.
  - Indian leaders are not likely--in this short term--to see their interests as being served by new attempts to promote turbulence or territorial disintegration in Pakistan.
  - President Daoud of Afghanistan will probably avoid an overly aggressive policy toward Pakistan in order to avoid serious dangers to his own regime.
  - The Soviet Union will continue to arm and assist India and Afghanistan, but will not seek to promote major instability in Pakistan.

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- The sudden assassination or incapacitation of Bhutto could markedly change the above predictions. It would create a much less stable situation.
  - Likely developments would include: a drawn-out struggle for power in Islamabad; an upsurge of unrest, particularly in the frontier provinces; and perhaps a takeover of the government by the armed forces.
  - The armed forces might have difficulty, as they did in the late 1960s, in restoring order to the country.
- Looking beyond the next two years, there are other scenarios that might produce a resurgence of Pakistan's historical instability.
  - Bhutto's penchant for using repressive tactics against his opponents could backfire. Strong opposition could flare up over a number of issues, and the armed forces could grow tired of helping Bhutto fight his political battles.
    - °At some point the military might attempt to seize power once again, with the same results described above.

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- It is also possible that internal pressures in India or Afghanistan could lead those countries to adopt more aggressive policies toward Pakistan.
- Any prolonged period of turbulence would heighten Islamabad's need for support from nations interested in preventing the disintegration of Pakistan.

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